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Rules Of Engagement: Seeking Moral and Legal Sufficiency in the 21st Century 
By Tanner Williams 
Abstract 
Modern conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan has proved to be unlike any other 
conflict in history. United States and Coalition forces are faced with an insurgent enemy 
that defies all pre-established Laws of Armed Combat. As we transition from a wartime 
operations to a peacekeeping environment, it is important to reflect upon the moral and 
legal struggles that our soldiers face in the line of duty. Certainly, it cannot be easy to 
distinguish between lawful or unlawful combatants and innocent civilians in a war that 
lacks a clearly defined enemy. As a result, it is necessary to examine our rules of 
engagement and our motivations for adherence to them. To do so, one must understand 
the foundation for United States rules of engagement and their legal applicability in the 
international arena. Critics would argue that the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan 
warrants a new strategy which discounts Laws of Armed Combat in pursuit of success; in 
other words, justifying our desired ends by their necessary means. Nevertheless, it is 
pertinent that the United States remain resolute in will, combating our enemies with 
respect to the ethical and legal guidelines laid out by the international community. In 
doing so, the virtues of freedom and democracy are better served, both domestically and 
abroad.   In modern conflict involving combat against insurgents and terrorists, the 
United States’ political structure and reputation necessitates adherence to specific rules of 
engagement that are in agreement with pre-established Laws of Armed Combat. Such 
adherence may somewhat compromise the safety of Coalition soldiers in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, but the defense of universal human rights and the foundations of international law is 
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arguably of the utmost importance if we wish to ensure stability and security within the 
international system.  
 
June 28, 2005 
 
For the average American this day came and went with little to differentiate it 
from any other day. Yet for the members of the Special Forces community and Navy 
SEAL Team 10, it would be a day of unparalleled tragedy and despair. As a part of 
Operation Redwing in Afghanistan, Michael Murphy, Marcus Luttrell, Danny Dietz and 
Matthew Axelson set out to seize an important member of the Taliban resistance force. 
They did not know then that their fate would be tied to a single, controversial strategic 
decision they soon would be forced to make. As they set up a position to scout the area 
and capture their target, they stumbled upon two seemingly innocent Afghan goat 
herders. It was this event that would shape their futures, and for three of the men, cost 
them their lives.  
 
The men were forced to debate the merits of two specific courses of action. First, 
they could release the goat herders with the hopes that their mission would not be 
compromised as a result. Unfortunately, there was no way for these men to differentiate 
between a Taliban informant and an innocent civilian. Obviously, this option posed a 
significant and immediate threat to their safety and the outcome of their mission. Second, 
they could eliminate the Afghans and dispose of the bodies in an effort to maintain their 
position and ensure the successful completion of their objective.  This option presented a 
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moral dilemma. Was it ethical, and equally important, legal, for these men to execute 
Afghan civilians who posed no immediate threat? In accordance to their supplied rules of 
engagement, how was the situation to be handled? At this point, the answer was clear to 
the members of SEAL Team 10. In their minds, killing the captives seemed to be both 
immoral and in violation of the international law that dictated their presence in 
Afghanistan.  
 
The repercussions of this decision proved to be grave. After little more than half 
an hour, they would find that the same Afghans whose lives they had spared had betrayed 
them. As a result, more than one hundred heavily armed Taliban soldiers flooded their 
position and an epic firefight ensued. Meanwhile, a valiant rescue effort was mobilized 
by a Special Forces helicopter insertion crew and remaining members of SEAL Team 10. 
Even the danger of a treacherous daylight insertion was not enough to dissuade these men 
from their sense of responsibility to their brothers-in-arms. The rocket propelled grenade 
ambush that downed their helicopter minutes later only added to the tragedy. As the sun 
set on that fateful day, nineteen Special Forces members and over seventy Taliban 
fighters were dead and one lone SEAL was lost behind enemy lines. In his work Lone 
Survivor, Marcus Luttrell recounts his subsequent journey to safety, which was one of 
countless miles, improbable luck, and unshakable determination. Such bravery is 
undeniably inspiring, but it cannot lessen the impact of the tragedy that took place. June 
28, 2005 has since been regarded as the deadliest day in American Special Forces history. 
 
The Law of War 
3
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With such events in mind, one question seems evident: what role did United 
States rules of engagement play in the massacre on June 28, 2005? Unfortunately, this 
question has not proved to be unique to the events of that horrific day. This debate dates 
as far back as the fifth century with St. Augustine’s concept of just war. Since then, this 
concept has evolved to reflect a number of political and social circumstances. The notion 
has regained prominence as the result of recent offensive and peacekeeping operations in 
Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. In this light, it is important to 
understand how these rules of engagement affect soldiers fighting in conflicts across the 
globe and how they relate to the topics of defense and international security. 
Furthermore, it is imperative that these principles be evaluated, and possibly changed, to 
better reflect the realities of modern warfare, specifically in areas such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Even so, this is not a simple topic to address. United States rules of 
engagement stand as the culmination of thousands of hours of political and strategic 
efforts and represent the United States’ adherence to international law. In this way, rules 
of engagement offer a sense of legitimacy and morality that might otherwise be obscure 
or absent in war. Nevertheless, these rules are surrounded by controversy. Arguments 
exist that claim that such strict regulation in a wartime environment compromises the 
safety of American soldiers and their ability to effectively combat the enemy. The threat 
of domestic prosecution often is seen as a shadow that looms over soldiers as they protect 
and serve their country in far-off battlefields. Others insist that such a notion is a fallacy, 
and that rules of engagement offer soldiers a comprehensive guide to their duties in a 
given conflict. Still, the controversy remains. This paper will explore the notion of 
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effectively altering U.S. rules of engagement as well as the various arguments that 
complement both realist and idealist perspectives.  
 
 To understand better the principles and purposes that support U.S. rules of 
engagement, it is important to examine their roots. From a strictly legal perspective, rules 
of engagement are the applicable extension of international law, or more specifically, the 
Law of Armed Combat (LOAC). Essentially, LOAC is “law regarding acceptable 
practices while engaged in war… that military personnel must consider to plan and 
execute operations and must obey in combat.”1 These laws cover the spectrum of issues 
from the Geneva Conventions such as torture, the treatment of prisoners of war, and the 
rules of engagement, which dictate acceptable targeting and action principles. They are 
the result of years of customary international agreements and humanitarian efforts. The 
most important concept that drives LOAC is the limiting of collateral damage and 
causalities as the result of war. Over time, the human race has been victim to increasingly 
violent and disastrous conflicts that have ended countless lives and destroyed innumerous 
families and homes. As warfare has increased in destructiveness and efficiency, such law 
has been increasingly necessary as a method of preservation for societies and cultures 
plagued by conflict. In the face of modern warfare, this notion has gained increasing 
acceptance, though it remains difficult to enforce effectively.  
 
 Law of Armed Combat is the summation of three essential principles: necessity, 
proportionality and discrimination. In a simple sense, each element of LOAC must be in 
                                                          
1 "Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)." USMilitary.About.com. 2007. 25 Oct. 2007 
<http://usmilitary.about.com>. 
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congruence with these principles to be considered legitimate.2 Military necessity is the 
first principle of LOAC. In essence, “military forces may only engage in acts necessary to 
accomplish a legitimate military objective that has been approved through the chain of 
command.”3 In this way, military action can be considered only as a last resort, and can 
do only what is necessary to ensure victory. Such considerations exist to deter tendencies 
to resort to violence as a means of coercion. The notion of military necessity instead 
promotes diplomacy as a means of action. Proportionality is the second principle of 
LOAC, and correlates strongly to the principle of military necessity. Proportionality 
dictates, “force must be limited to only that which is required to feasibly secure an 
objective. Any exercise of force beyond such a margin is considered unlawful.”4 This 
translates into the responsible use of applicable military might; it is lawful only to target 
objectives that contribute to the military efforts of the enemy. It is unlawful to target the 
homes of innocent civilians, churches, synagogues, mosques or businesses simply 
because of their proximity to a legitimate military target. Unfortunately, this is sometimes 
difficult to ensure given the chaotic nature of war and the unclear distinction of innocence 
in a war zone. In addition, LOAC includes the notion of discrimination. It is most clearly 
defined as the “discrimination between lawful combatant targets and noncombatant 
targets such as civilians, civilian property, POWs and wounded personnel who are out of 
combat.”5 This must be done in an effort to engage only valid military targets. Lawful 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
2 Ibid. 
 
3 Ibid.  
 
4 Ibid.  
 
5 Ibid.  
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combatants are defined as those who are members of a legitimately recognized force, be 
it regular or irregular. They are expected to present themselves as combatants, including 
the presentation of uniforms and insignia, with clear leadership and accountability, and 
they may be engaged with impunity under the auspice of war. Unlawful combatants, also 
defined by LOAC, are individuals who participate in hostilities without being authorized 
by a government. They too may be legally engaged if they are actively involved in 
hostilities. Noncombatants are defined as those who are legitimately removed from 
hostilities, though they may be present during conflicts. LOAC clearly dictates that the 
engagement of noncombatants is a violation with criminal liability. It is with these 
guidelines in mind that legitimate military action is shaped and made reality. 
Unfortunately, the legal ambiguity of LOAC becomes evident in most applicable wartime 
efforts, and can further complicate confusing situations. 
 
Law in the Field 
 
 Rules of Engagement (ROE) are considered the most direct and effective 
extension of LOAC in modern times. These rules are defined as “directives issued by 
competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under 
which an armed force will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other 
forces.”6 They are legally binding guidelines to which every legitimate solider is held 
accountable, and violations are dealt with through the use of court martial and military 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
6 Eberhart, Dave. "Rules of Engagement: Can Our Troops Defend Themselves?" 
NewsMax.Com. 6 Dec. 2005. 25 Oct. 2007 <www.newsmax.com>. 
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punishment. These rules are not meant to deter soldiers from legitimate action, but 
instead to guide them in decision-making on the battlefield. Within the United States 
Military, these rules are printed on cards to be carried by soldiers as a means of reference.  
 
In many cases, ROE dictate a method of de-escalation of hostilities as opposed to 
outright lethality. Often, this method is presented as a progression of actions that only 
resort to violence under extreme circumstances. During the 2003 offensive, American 
ROE dictated that a soldier must: 
 
a. SHOUT; verbal warnings to HALT or “QIF” (pronounced “COUGH”) 
b. SHOVE: physically restrain, block access, or detain. 
c. SHOOT:  to remove the threat of death/serious bodily injury or to protect designated 
property.7 
 
This progression is in light of the fact that ROE clearly state that as a soldier  
 
You may use force, up to and including deadly force, against hostile actors in self-
defense, in defense of your unit and other US Forces or to prevent the theft, damage, or 
destruction of firearms, ammunition, explosives, or property designated by your 
Commander as vital to national security. (Rules for Use of Force Reference Card) 8 
 
These rules are in conjunction with the notion that a soldier should attempt to resolve 
                                                          
7 Coalition Forces Rules for Use of Force Reference Card, Iraq (2003) 
 
8 Ibid. 
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conflict on the battlefield through the use of a minimum amount of force. The concept of 
minimum force is further defined by the following criteria:  
 
If you must fire: 
1. Fire only aimed shots. NO WARNING SHOTS. 
2. Fire no more rounds than necessary. 
3. Fire with due regard for the safety of innocent bystanders. 
4. Take reasonable efforts not to destroy property. 
5. Stop firing as soon as the situation permits.9 
 
Furthermore, soldiers are expected to “not target or strike hospitals, mosques, churches, 
shrines, schools, museums, national monuments, and any other historical cultural sites, 
civilian populated areas or buildings UNLESS the enemy is using them for military 
purposes or if necessary for your self defense.”10  
 
 While these ROE were unique to early U.S. involvement in Iraq, they remain 
similar to ROE found currently in other conflict areas, and can be considered somewhat 
representative. Unfortunately for the purposes of this evaluation, the most current Iraq 
and Afghanistan ROE are unavailable; “rules of engagement are for the most part 
classified as for ‘limited’ distribution only.”11 This should be seen as an effort to protect 
soldiers from public misinterpretation and enemy abuse. However, it can be assumed that 
                                                          
9 Ibid.  
 
10 Ibid 
 
11 Eberhart  
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any current ROE similarly promote the principles of LOAC, and are utilized so as to 
guide efforts and minimize unnecessary collateral damage. 
 
Understanding Idealism  
 
 Considered in its modern context, the discussion of ROE is often a divisive one. 
Some support ROE based upon theoretical and idealistic principles, while others criticize 
ROE from a realistic perspective. While both sides present compelling evidence for their 
arguments, the effectiveness of ROE remains debatable. This debate is one of the central 
themes in Marcus Luttrell’s work, and has gained undeniable prominence as a result of 
the Iraq War and the War on Terror.  
 
 When examining the merits of these perspectives, it is best to start ROE’s 
theoretical justifications. Supporters of ROE and LOAC focus on what they attempt to 
accomplish, not what they may or may not realistically accomplish. First and foremost, 
ROE attempt to eliminate collateral damage within a war zone. This is not only a method 
of saving innocent lives, but also a way of retaining important points of infrastructure that 
help promote post conflict rebuilding. With the scale of modern conflict, this is 
indisputably necessary. The rebuilding process has been an integral part of post-war 
reconciliation since World War I, and remains so today in Iraq and Afghanistan. Less 
time spent physically rebuilding a war-torn area results in more time and effort applied to 
the political and social resolution that follows. In addition to this principle, ROE creates a 
more secure environment for noncombatants. War undeniably affects those who are not 
10
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involved, but ROE represent an effort to promote their safety. This is integral in an effort 
to win the hearts and minds of people affected by war, which has arguably been the 
Coalition’s strategy in Iraq. Ideally, U.S. forces invaded Iraq to dispose a tyrannical 
dictator and seize possible weapons of mass destruction. ROE were in place to protect 
those opposed to Saddam Hussein and make evident the benevolent intentions of the 
United States. Certainly, the effectiveness of this is questionable, but a theoretical 
intention for such efforts does indeed exist. Obviously, the most basic principle of LOAC 
and ROE is the preservation of basic human rights. This grants humanitarian legitimacy 
not only to military operations, but more importantly, to the governments and politicians 
that sponsor them.  
 
 Legality is another important source of legitimacy in modern times. On a 
theoretical basis, ROE and LOAC provide this legitimacy. They create a system of 
accountability for the actions of combatants, and a system of justice for criminal liability. 
The willingness to adhere to a system of international law enhances an image of fairness 
and responsibility. In light of the controversy surrounding the Guantanamo Bay detention 
facility and Abu Ghraib prison, it is important that adherence to LOAC and ROE within 
conflict zones restore the United States’ tarnished international image. This also could 
translate into the acquisition of new allies—especially tribal/civilian organizations 
currently in Iraq and Afghanistan—to aid with legitimate military objectives, and 
ultimately achieve some sort of perceived victory.  Again, the degree of success garnered 
in this area is debatable, but public prosecution of violations within the U.S. Armed 
Forces has provided a certain amount of legitimacy to the system of international law.  
11
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Understanding Realism 
 
Supporters of ROE may praise international law and ROE for maintaining 
accountability within war, but realists often cite that ROE promote a more dangerous 
environment for legitimate fighting forces, especially in modern times when enemies are 
most often insurgent forces who blend in with the civilian masses. This sentiment has 
existed since the Vietnam War, which in many ways mirrors the progression of the war in 
Iraq. Most directly, in response to ROE in Vietnam, Senator Barry Goldwater said, “I am 
ashamed of my country for having had people who would have allowed such restrictions 
to have been placed upon men who were trained to fight, men who were trained to make 
decisions . . . and men who were risking their lives. . . .  I pray . . . such foolish 
restrictions never be formed again and applied to our troops.”12 In much the same way as 
in Vietnam, soldiers in Iraq are having immense difficulty differentiating between 
civilians, informants, and combatants. Critics claim that strict adherence to ROE results 
in hesitation, which can lead to death in a firefight or battlefield situation. This sentiment 
is widely shared by members of the Special Forces, who often face far more dangerous 
and ambiguous situations than the average soldier. Even Navy SEALs must sometimes be 
hampered by “ROE that are very specific: [they] may not open fire until we are fired 
upon or have positively identified [their] enemy or have proof of his intentions.”13 With 
deadly force considered a last resort, it seems clear that soldiers are being put in severely 
                                                          
12 Parks, W. H. "Deadly Force is Authorized." Proceedings Magazine 127 (2001). US Naval Institute. 2 
Nov. 2007. 
 
13 Luttrell, Marcus. Lone Survivor. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 37 
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compromising positions. Situations in Bosnia that seem to echo such a sentiment have 
been brought to public attention in recent years. One account claims that a senior enlisted 
soldier “was awarded a medal for following his ROE and exercising restraint” in light of 
the fact that two of his men were brutally beaten by Serbs.14 By all accounts, these men 
were entitled to the use of force but refused for fear of ROE violations.  Some military 
personnel feel that “these [events] are representative rather than isolated incidents.”15 
 
 Considering the nature of the modern threats faced in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. 
adherence to ROE and LOAC pose a significantly different challenge. In many regards, 
our adherence to LOAC in the face of enemy disregard of similar standards seems 
irrational. For the most part, modern insurgent forces in Iraq and Afghanistan do not 
accept ROE and do not abide by LOAC. Insurgents often disguise themselves as civilians 
or engage Coalition forces in the company of true non-combatants, such as women and 
children. By engaging in such forms of asymmetric warfare, these insurgents are fighting 
as unlawful combatants within these war zones. Critics argue that this status, in 
conjunction with their outright disregard for LOAC, warrants the intentional disregard of 
ROE by American troops. “There is no other way to beat a terrorist.” Luttrell claims. 
“You must fight like him, or he will surely kill you.”16 Other Military leaders also feel 
that 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
14 Parks  
 
15 Ibid.  
 
16 Luttrell, 28 
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overly restrictive ROEs are a key factor in the loss of confidence by company-grade 
officers and enlisted soldiers and Marines in their senior leaders and in the exodus of 
good men and women from the military. Worse, operating under bad ROEs invites 
mission failure, usually with fatal consequences to men and women who deserve better.17  
 
 Beyond the repercussions of actual ROE related events, it also seems that ROE in 
general pose a threat to modern fighting forces. Members of the United States Armed 
Forces  
 
understand that they must obey ROE because they happen to come under the laws of the 
country which they are sworn to serve. But they represent a danger; they undermine 
confidence on the battlefield in the fight against world terror. Worse yet, they make 
soldiers concerned, disheartened, and sometimes hesitant.18  
 
 This stems from misunderstandings most often attributed to public media. Some 
feel that “the liberal media will joyfully accuse [them] of being murderers or 
barbarians… for defending themselves too vigorously when they have been placed in 
harms way by their government.”19 This problem is only exacerbated by the feeling that 
“in Washington, the human rights of terrorists are often given a high priority.”20 
Unfortunately, such a perspective stems from our inability to discern the nuances of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
17 Parks 
 
18 Luttrell, 38 
 
19 Luttrell 39 
 
20 Luttrell 37 
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Middle Eastern culture and the differences between terrorists and civilians. This is 
essentially where the principle of discrimination fails, especially in modern media. Both 
soldiers and American civilians are trying to understand the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and all too often are making conclusions based upon incomplete evidence. 
Similar to controversy surrounding the Vietnam War, “most generals who manage the 
war feel that these rules of engagement are understood and fairly well adhered to, which 
is why, as one general put it, ‘the rare exceptions cause such a stink.’”21  
 
Perspectives versus Reality 
 
 Obviously, people on both sides of this argument think that they lay claim to the 
truth. Unfortunately, this muddles the underlying truth of the situation. Military officers 
could endlessly argue the merits of either perspective, and ultimately will. In stark 
contrast to Ret. USMC Colonel W. Hays Parks’ realist perspective, some would argue 
that the reality of ROE in modern combat is not so bleak. For instance, others would 
claim that soldiers are not “hamstrung or hampered in any way, shape or form by their 
rules of engagement and don't have to wait until fired upon to take action, as has been 
reported in some outlets.”22 Likewise, similar arguments assert that “if someone's setting 
up down the street and preparing to take you under fire or set up a mortar position 
somewhere where you don't have direct fire upon them, the Marines are able to go ahead 
                                                          
21 Kinnard, Douglas. "Vietnam Reconsidered: an Attitudinal Survey of United States 
Army General Officers." The Public Opinion Quarterly 39 (1976): 445-456. 
 451). 
 
22 Rhem, Kathleen. "Marines Not Hampered by Rules of Engagement." American Forces Information 
Service (2004). 3 Nov. 2007 <www.globalsecurity,org>. 
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and take some limited - as they see fit - offensive action to prevent that.”23 At this point, 
the argument tends to regress into inconclusiveness.  Each side believes what they want 
to believe, and will seek out specific evidence to support it. As it stands, there seems to 
be an abundance of evidence to support either perspective, further complicating the issue.  
 
Distinctions must ultimately be made. To better understand the nature of ROE in 
modern warfare, one must understand the state of conflict in which we live. All too often, 
both sides of this argument will assert that our ROE are either fit or unfit for the wars we 
are fighting in the Middle East. Unfortunately, we no longer are fighting a classically 
defined war in Iraq or Afghanistan. In this sense, both perspectives are guilty of a gross 
misappropriation of effort. By design, “rules of engagement are mission- and threat-
driven policy.”24 It is necessary to understand the distinction between war and 
peacekeeping, because it is integral to the form of ROE that will arise. ROE evolution 
must mirror intention, and for the most part has done so admirably in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. While many understand the restrictiveness of ROE in these areas today and 
may criticize them as a result, they fail to understand how the ROE have in fact evolved. 
Initial  
 
wartime ROE permit United States forces to fire on all identified enemy targets, 
regardless of whether those targets represent actual, immediate threats. By contrast, 
during peacetime, peacetime ROE [SROE] permit engagement in individual, unit, or 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
23 Ibid. 
 
24 Parks.  
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national self-defense --- the sole legal ground for international use of force during 
peacetime.25  
 
Many people don’t understand the fluidity of ROE in modern conflicts. Often, they 
change as objectives change, in an effort to allow the greatest amount of leeway possible. 
Even so, as we attempt to transition from Coalition oversight to Iraqi democracy, our 
ROE must evolve to reflect our emphasis on peacekeeping, and more importantly, to 
promote Iraqi responsibility and autonomy. The same goes for transitional efforts in 
Afghanistan with the Afghan people.  
 
This understanding is of the utmost importance. Critics will continue to attack the 
United States for unnecessarily putting its soldiers in harms way, but do so without a 
complete understanding of the circumstances. Similarly, idealists will undoubtedly tout a 
higher standard of morality, which can only be realized in a post-war state.   
Simply put, “war is war. If you want to win, you have to fight.”26 Essentially, wartime 
ROE cannot successfully promote a peacetime environment, and peacekeeping ROE 
cannot win a war. The distinction must be made, lest we go on addressing the wrong 
issues altogether.  
 
Blueprint for Democracy and Peace 
 
                                                          
25 Rhem, Kathleen. "Marines Not Hampered by Rules of Engagement." American Forces Information 
Service (2004). 3 Nov. 2007 <www.globalsecurity,org>. 
 
26 [Anonymous], LCDR, USN. Personal interview. 19 Jan. 2008. 
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 While ROE have proven successful in the past, events similar to those chronicled 
in Luttrell’s Lone Survivor have prompted a significant question: What place do ROE 
have in modern unconventional warfare? The answer is not simple. We can look to the 
past, and blame stringent ROE for the death of brave Special Forces operators on June 
28, 2005, but we must ultimately look at the bigger picture. First, it is important to 
address the issue of democracy and peace in war torn countries in the Middle East. No 
matter how unflattering, it is obvious that the United States has made an effort to create 
democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan and promote peace and international security. This 
is an undeniably American agenda; nevertheless, it is a step in the right direction.  
 
With that in mind, one might ask how clearly defined peacekeeping ROE in 
postwar Iraq and Afghanistan would further this cause. Insurgency is an obvious problem 
and, by most accounts, will not be fading any time soon. Even so, our current 
peacekeeping ROE in Iraq and Afghanistan, by necessity, reflect a sense of dignity and 
responsibility inherent in U.S. ideals. Following the use of force, “a recurring challenge 
[often presents itself] to the military and civilian components of such operations, to 
[rehabilitate] the forces of law and order. This is an ROE issue because of the military's 
participation, possibly through the use of force, in supporting the civilian aspects of the 
operation.”27 If we are to prove our commitment to Iraqi and Afghan freedom, we must 
treat the people of these countries in a way that reflects our commitment to our own 
domestic security. This means that we cannot do away with ROE. Essentially, we must 
make every effort to treat insurgents, who are absolutely unlawful combatants in these 
                                                          
27 Bowens, Glenn. "Legal Issues in Peace Operations." Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly 
(1998): 51-72. 21 Nov. 2007 <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/>. 
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postwar areas, like the criminals that they are. Currently, these insurgents are identified 
predominantly by observable, threatening actions. Unfortunately, there is no better or 
more fool proof way to identify a terrorist, so the harsh reality of the situation must be 
accepted: identifying combatants, lawful or unlawful, remains the weakest link in the 
legal war-fighting and peacekeeping processes. With that in mind, we must address what 
should be done with those who are identified as combatants. In an effort to promote 
peacekeeping ROE, we must treat them as we treat criminals in our own country. We 
must afford them the opportunity to surrender, and utilize lethal force only as a last resort. 
These enemies are becoming little more than outlaws of their own societies as we move 
toward a democratic future, and thus should be treated as such. Critics must come to 
terms with the fact that our soldiers are being utilized in a police-like role within these 
developing states.  Their duty is to preserve peace, much like municipal police officers. 
While it may be questionable to utilize our troops in such a fashion, it must be accepted 
as reality for the time being. Likewise, we must continue toward the goal of 
democratization of Iraq and Afghanistan until we are successful, or until we are willing to 
abandon the enterprise completely.  
 
 The issue of international security and action in the Middle East is undeniably 
important, but it all too often overshadows another equally important issue—the ability of 
soldiers to cope with what they may be forced to do as a result of war, and all too often, 
peacekeeping. With increasing frequency, men and women are experiencing post-
traumatic stress disorder related to the horrors of war. In the current state of affairs, 
soldiers are often exposed to a degree of hyper-violence that is incomprehensible to the 
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average person. Soldiers may witness the brutal killing of civilians or comrades, and may 
not be equipped to cope with such atrocities. Unfortunately, this is a fact of war. But for 
some individuals, ROE and LOAC offer a respite from the revulsion they may feel. “If 
you have rules, it instills a greater sense of morality. We have to do it this way, because 
that is what America is about.”28 With a strong sense of purpose, men can bear the 
unbearable and do the undoable. ROE go a long way in instilling such a purpose even if 
one’s enemy is unwilling to concede to the laws of war. In the end, the issue is not about 
whether our enemies will extend such privileges to us in our time of need. Ideally, war 
should be grounded in international law, but as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
shown us, that is not the case. Instead, it seems better to take the high road, adhering to an 
elevated moral and ethical standard.  
 
A Change for the Better? 
 
In light of such conclusions, it would be ignorant to claim that our current ROE 
are perfect. In reality, they represent a noble step in the right direction, which will 
ultimately benefit from refinement. Most importantly, we must address the issue of 
clarification, because “superfluous language in rules of engagement has illogically and 
without legal foundation elevated the concern for civilian casualties above the desire for 
mission success and aircrew safety.”29 For the most part, ROE were created to be simple, 
yet comprehensive; nevertheless, a multitude of qualifications exist, each adding to the 
                                                          
28 [Anonymous]. 
 
29 Humphries, John. "Opertaions Law and the Rules of Engagement." Airpower Journal (1992). 7 Nov. 
2007 <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil>. 
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complication of the overall intention. It seems as though such complexity was 
unintentional, and in most cases was meant as a means of further clarification. 
Unfortunately, vast revisions and additions only served to lose sight of the initial goal. 
Politicians, generals and admirals too far removed from the fighting have ultimately 
created what has become an incomprehensible beast. Even Special Forces operators have 
felt the repercussions of overly complicated ROE. “Every SEAL team has a 
corresponding JAG Officer assigned to investigate ROE violations,” simply because too 
many legal qualifications exist.”30  
 
The legal disconnect that exists surrounding this issue is one that stands to benefit 
most from a reshaping of international law and ROE in modern conflicts. Certainly, “A 
number of modern treaties regulate the conduct of hostilities, with the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 providing a legal core.”31 Even with that said, legal applicability is 
not nearly as clear when the circumstances of peacekeeping operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are considered. In all reality, “law-of-war treaties were expressly adopted to 
regulate the conduct of interstate armed conflict… with limited sub-rules regulating civil 
war.”32 Some might argue that this disconnect legitimizes an abandonment of LOAC and 
ROE in peacekeeping efforts. In this way, ROE stand simply as American foreign policy, 
with no tangible basis in international law. In a legal sense,  
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there is no treaty that covers (or even imagines) situations where privately organized 
armed forces cross international borders, stalk international sea lanes, or strike at 
international aviation for their own ideological or political purposes. Such conduct 
constitutes private international warfare, a deployment bereft of any legality under the 
laws of war. (Hoffman) 33 
 
This undoubtedly characterizes modern conflict, especially in the Middle East, and brings 
to light an unsettling argument: American (and Coalition) forces adhere to LOAC and 
ROE in conflicts against terrorists and insurgents as a matter of choice, not as a matter of 
legality. In this light, it seems as though international law requires amendment to clarify 
such discrepancies. Certainly, one could argue that this is an oversimplification of 
international law, but the fact remains that no internationally enforceable legislation 
currently exists to deal with the unique threat and legal ambiguity poised by modern 
terrorist and insurgent combatants. Until an international enforcement agency can be 
established for such a purpose, the duty falls to the United States as the sole remaining 
superpower on earth. Nevertheless, the United States choice to adhere to LOAC and ROE 
must be continued in an effort to promote the ethics and values the United States wishes 
to proliferate.  
 
 Are overly complex ROE to blame for the tragedy that took place on June 28, 
2005, deep within the Afghan mountains? This may partially address the issue, but is by 
no means a comprehensive answer. Without a doubt, the members of SEAL Team 10 
faced a distinct ROE dilemma, and they ultimately paid with their lives. Ideally, “If the 
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ROE are briefed correctly and everyone is trained on how to utilize them correctly, the 
required 'legally protected' response meshes with that person's training or Standard 
Operating Procedures” (Anonymous). The discrepancy that surfaced among the members 
of SEAL Team 10 seems to show how ROE might not sufficiently mesh with given 
objectives and training. Such a conclusion by no means undermines the immense moral 
dilemma those men faced, but a relative inapplicability of their specific ROE did play a 
role in the events that took place, as did the comparative uniqueness of the situation itself.  
 
 Nevertheless, one lesson must be learned. To better serve American troops 
fighting insurgents and terrorists, rules of engagement must be clear and concise, 
regardless of the strategy that they emphasize. They must also have an undisputable 
foundation in international law, which specifically addresses the nature of a given 
conflict. Likewise, soldiers must be rigorously trained in their use and have a clear 
understanding of them before setting foot in combat. As our fighting force becomes more 
sophisticated, ignorance can no longer be tolerated. In addition, the leadership must take 
responsibility for making clear the ultimate goal of its efforts and how ROE specifically 
promote success. Universal ROE are not the answer, because every conflict is unique and 
requires individual attention. In many ways, this is an adoption of a Special Forces-like 
mentality, in that each objective or mission requires specific examination and attention to 
detail. Even so, it is obvious that such a perspective is entirely unrealistic. The average 
grunt on the ground simply does not have the training or resources to approach each and 
every event with the professionalism and comprehensiveness of a Navy SEAL, Army 
Green Beret, or Air Force Combat Controller. 
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 It also seems as though the need for change exists in how public media understand 
and interpret the actions of our Armed Forces on the modern battlefield and how such 
action relates to specific ROE. A serious disconnect exists when soldiers fear prosecution 
from the society which they are acting to defend. The reality is that the average American 
is not capable of understanding the complexities of war. Because of this, they should not 
expect to be informed unconditionally on matters of national and international security. 
There are far too many nuances of international relations that never make the evening 
news. While not ideal, the fact remains that questionable exceptions are made, though 
most often with national interests in mind.  
 
Learning from our Mistakes 
 
With such conclusions in mind, what courses of action were realistically available 
to the men of SEAL Team 10 on the day of June 28, 2005? Legally, it is difficult to 
discern. The true intentions and specified rules of engagement regarding Operation 
Redwing will undoubtedly remain classified for years to come. If they were bound to a 
standard form of United States peacekeeping ROE, then we can reasonably assume that 
they came to the right conclusion. They respected the human rights of two Afghan goat 
herders, even to the point of risking their own lives.  In a way, their actions furthered the 
legitimacy of American peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan beyond what they probably 
realized. Such abstract success far outweighs any failure that may have occurred on that 
day. They essentially took responsibility for their country’s efforts, and sacrificed 
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themselves in the name of legality and morality.     
 
American military and strategic policy is not perfect;  
 
modern conventional ground operations will continue to challenge the professional, 
moral, and legal skills of commanders. Future commanders will have to balance the 
professional obligations of the mission and its successful accomplishment with the moral 
obligation to minimize risk to troops under their command. They will also have to 
balance the objectives and conduct of the mission with their legal obligation to safeguard 
the surrounding noncombatant population.34  
 
Mistakes have been made in Iraq and Afghanistan, which may have been directly 
responsible for the loss of a great number of lives, both American and foreign; “however, 
they certainly can serve as a model for future combat operations insofar as the effective 
application of rules of engagement is concerned. Years of military education, preparation, 
exercises, and analysis” have laid the foundation for an effective system of international 
law.35 Unfortunately, it is currently little more than a foundation. The Law of Armed 
Combat encompasses the principles necessary to grant legitimacy to a wide range of 
causes, but nevertheless has been found lacking under modern circumstances. As a result, 
there is no universal solution to our issues of international security, and more specifically, 
military policy abroad. Our rules of engagement represent a legitimate effort to promote 
the notion of human rights on a global scale, but there are obvious challenges ahead. 
                                                          
34 Butler, 
 
35 Humphries. 
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These lie mostly with enemies that embody a disregard for human life, namely Islamic 
Radicals. That is not to say that our problems would cease in their absence. History has 
proved to be cyclical, often unearthing conflicts long thought buried. With this in mind, it 
is inevitable that another enemy will rise up if the turmoil in the Middle East is ever 
brought to an end. Because of this, it is best that we make a genuine effort to spread the 
principles of life and peace wherever they are lacking. If the use of force is necessary to 
promote peace, then so be it; but at least a system will be in place that upholds a sense of 
liability and morality, however imperfect it may be. Most importantly, we must 
understand that “prosecuting war legally while at the same time treating [enemy] soldiers 
and civilians humanely is essential to maintaining domestic and international public 
support” and ensuring the future of domestic and international security.36  
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